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Abstract: The combined effect of the increasing international travellers flows together with the 
risks due to illicit traffics and terrorism makes the evolution of actual borders control points a 
must. This both to eliminate borders bottlenecks, improve security and optimise the efforts. The 
present paper briefly introduces a general view on today’s and tomorrow’s border control 
system exploring and proposing new operational methods and solutions for border control 
procedures to increase the efficacy and efficiency of the whole security screening system at the 
same time reducing the efforts (costs/resources). The general description of the system logic and 
architecture introduces the core of the solution, the Trust Assessment System. A “black box” 
based on risk analysis and advanced machine learning algorithms aimed to assign a Traveller 
Trust Score to each single individual intentioned to cross the border. Main benefits are: 
improved checkpoint throughput, improved situational awareness and level of security, better 
traveller experience, optimisation of resources. The concept is that the traveller risk evaluation 
starts as soon as she/he applies for a visa, a passport or books a trip by whatever means of 
transport.  
Keywords: border security. risk assessment, big data, human factors  
Setting the scene 
The international travel flows continue to rise both thanks to low cost flights and countries that 
recently approached the tourism market playing a key role due to the huge number of travellers. This 
scale up of flows causes a growing pressure on border’s check points and the need to process large 
volumes of people and goods at the crossing points without creating bottlenecks; at the same time, 
there is a need to provide better security at the borders (land, sea, air), keeping technology costs 
related to border crossing points (BCP – extended control area1) as low as possible. While security 
cannot be compromised, the traveller’s experience should be positive. Trans-border crime causes 
border instability and vice-versa; hence strengthening border control helps to reduce crime, 
apprehend terrorists and detect prohibited weapons thus making safer the country. Yet, at the same 
time, measures need to be appropriate, in terms of efficiency (i.e. large numbers of crossings require 
                                               
1 e.g. BCP area may include part of the motorways or railroad stations equipped with cameras and sensors. 
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quick control checks; maintaining the current level of checks is becoming increasingly expensive), 
while assuring the effectiveness (i.e. potential threats have to be detected, whereas bona fide crossings 
should be made smoother or seamless). In order to achieve such goals, risk-based methods and 
systems for screening at border crossing must be defined and actually implemented2. The use of smart 
and novel detection technology along with advanced data analytics can truly help to improve 
detection of potentially dangerous people and goods while limiting to fewer accurate checks informed 
by pre-selected and preliminary (and non-disruptive) risk-based analysis of the flows, in respect of 
the quality of life of the traveller, and adding economic vitality to the union of states. 
European external borders  
There is a need to define tomorrow’s European's border control system and inter BCP real time 
information sharing, exploring and proposing new operational methods and solutions for border 
control procedures and identify new paths toward the effective and efficient adoption in real 
scenarios. The primary objective will be to provide the border control operators and practitioners with 
enhanced situational awareness, and capabilities to timely and proper identification of 
potentially dangerous people and goods, thus preventing smuggling and human trafficking.  
Assumptions 
In the proposed system perspective, the security check starts the moment a person buys a ticket or 
applies for a passport or visa (i.e., the earlier the information is provided, the better). New 
technologies enable the creation or integration of a personal traveller profile. In order to enhance 
security, improve efficiency and reduce costs, we start from four assumptions: 
a) NOT all EU borders are equal – maritime and terrestrial perimeters, as well as Northern and Southern 
perimeters, require different screening strategies because the people crossing borders and the chorography 
shaping them are different;  
b) NOT all travellers and goods bring the same risk. Bona-fide travellers need to feel safe, secure and at 
ease with the related ‘bureaucratic’ process. On the other hand, travellers and goods that compromise 
security and safety should be better detected; 
c) The flow of travellers is increasing due to many reasons: tourism, economic migration, political and war 
refugees; 
d) The scarcity of human resources to perform security screenings compared to the increasing flow of 
travellers. 
                                               
2 Such methods have to particularly pay attention to data protection and ethical concerns, such as social sorting/discrimination, increased exposure to violence, reduction 
of physical liberty/bodily integrity, invasive searches, reduction of freedom of movement, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, data protection, surveillance, use 
of irrelevant data, function creep and chilling effects. 
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Time management is essential to efficiently perform security checks, thus ensuring an increasing need 
of higher throughput. The outcomes will range from a light check for bona-fide travellers to a in 
depth-check or denial to access for risky travellers. 
Today’s and tomorrow’s security screenings concept 
In today’s security screenings: 
• Travellers are all the same (and, thus, bring the same risk); 
• The screening process is entirely performed at the Border Crossing Point (BCP) (if no visa is required 
there are no security-related pre-screenings); 
• The (security) screening targets are mainly the dangerous goods carried by travellers; 
• (Human) Screeners interpret the outcomes of X-ray and ultrasonic scanners and no (or very little) 
interpretation of both the “(historical) profile of the traveller” and the human behaviour shown at the 
Border Crossing Point (BCP) is performed; 
• Security screens are concentrated in relatively small, typically congested Border Crossing Point areas 
only. 
In today’s concept the human function is then used for interpreting what the machine says (i.e. what 
sensors read). The range of technologies employed is substantially limited to x-ray and ultrasonic 
equipment. More rarely, sniffers (for explosives) and thermo-graphic cameras (as those used with the 
SARS infection to quarantine monitoring of visitors to a country) are employed to screen travellers 
and support decision-making. In terms of data sharing3, today the European situation is all but 
harmonised both in terms of data processing and assessment protocols, as well as in terms of Key 
Security Indicators (KSI) and security resources usage. 
In tomorrow’s security screenings: 
• The screening target will be both smuggling (e.g., concealed weapons, stowaways, illegal substances) 
and the abnormal behaviour of travellers and their estimated intentions; 
• Travellers will be clustered into virtual homogenous, risk-based groups and processed accordingly; 
• Checks will be performed at different stages in the travel process, from the time the traveller arranges 
his or her travel until arrival at his or her destination4;  
• Human functions will directly contribute, with the support of machines and/or animals, in evaluating 
the traveller’s profile, behaviour and intentions. 
                                               
3 Air carriers still do not share with airport security relevant information about passengers till the last minute. 
4 e.g. in new “global” approach - even outside airports’ perimeters in case of a flying traveller 
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Human functions are more precisely termed Human Factors. This is a scientific discipline concerned 
with the understanding of the interactions among humans and other elements of a system, data and 
methods to design in order to optimize well-being and overall system performance; this approach to 
the check system involves more in general the human, technological and organisational (HTO) model. 
Tomorrow security screenings HTO model: We must re-think the way technological and human 
functions are linked. The new human, technological and organisational (HTO) model must be defined 
based on three innovative pillars: A) Risk-based security screening; B) Security checks typology and, 
when possible, positioning; C) Real-time and batch networked information sharing.  
Main components and objectives 
The proposed solution will implement an innovative, international alert system based on the real time 
updated information stored in the system platform. The basic concept includes a” combined” risk–
analysis-based system for border and customs authorities and security, this will improve: 
Coordination and enable close cooperation among authorities; Solutions for remote detection of 
abnormal behaviours, could this also include behaviour in the social media. A double tier risk-based 
approach proposes innovation around the concept of customised configuration of border control 
points (European Modular Border Crossing Point - EMC), the adoption of a risk-based BCP decision-
making process (Trust Assessment System – TAS) and, for the purposes of improved risk-
management coordination and cooperation, the EU Security Dashboard (ESD). More effective use of 
intelligence to reduce risks at borders.  
Objective 1.  Change the border crossing point paradigm from the current “check-everything-at-the-
border” to the more efficient “check-everything-till-the-border” (i.e., from a “checkpoint” to a 
“check-process”) by exploiting intelligence to assess and reduce the risk at BCPs, while improving 
the coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among all relevant stakeholders, such as 
border control authorities. 
Objective 2.  Improve security checks from the current “memory-less” approach to a more advanced 
risk-based approach (i.e. based on both historical and current quantity and quality of information 
provided); 
In the proposed model a risk-based pre-screening (i.e. before the border crossing point) is not just 
possible but needed to start profiling the traveller and better use the resources at the BCP, the personal 
information relating to the traveller matters as well as “when” it is provided (i.e. timely or not). The 
proposed model starts from the assumption that bona fide travellers may be willing to share their 
personal information to ensure a safer and more secure society, given the assurance that their 
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information is securely stored, properly used and not manipulated5. In addition, the Fast Track APP 
will include soft incentives for them to cooperate, in the form of nudges, or small incentives like free 
Wi-Fi or points on the frequent traveller card. The user experience of the whole service will be 
analysed to avoid cumbersome and lengthy data entry. 
Double tier risk-based approach 
One of the key innovation factors is a double tier risk-based approach. On the top level the dynamic 
Modular Border Crossing Point (MBCP) risk-based approach considers the first assumption “NOT 
all borders are equal” in the specific field of typical risks related to the single BCP optimising the 
use of resources. An additional goal is to reduce the cost of technologies in border security 
applications as a result of risk-based scalable modular border crossing point (MBCP) configuration, 
and on the shelf low cost technologies to integrate current physical-inspections-based security checks 
with contactless or low-invasive detection mechanisms. This early and proactive risk analysis results 
in an evaluation that represents an input to cross-border checks enabling the identification of bona-
fide travellers, with the ultimate goal of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of border crossing 
activities while reducing costs. 
Trust Assessment System 
As a consequence of the second assumption “NOT all travellers and goods bring the same risk” we 
find the Trust Assessment System (TAS)6. The approach proposes a mix of technological and human 
functions to identify the “level of trust” characterising each traveller, a score plus some “instructions” 
about how to interpret the score will represent the output of the “black box” we call TAS. For the 
purposes of this document we term “sensor” any “module” providing a normalised input to the TAS, 
that means we consider as input a wide range of data coming from personal information voluntarily 
provided by travellers to CBRN detectors. Each BCP is configured accordingly with the local needs; 
this means a potentially different arrangement of “sensors”, each active sensor will transfer on the 
system hub a rich set of normalised data7, TAS will receive such normalised data including historical 
data coming from the Dashboard8 and process them thanks to the harmonious balance of technology 
and human factors to identify a Traveller Trust Score9. The TTS will provide the basis for each 
traveller screening and will be broadcasted on the system Dashboard. In the proposed HTO model, 
                                               
5 Personal information will be provided on a voulountary basis and will managed in compliance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
6 Trust Assessment System  - the adoption of a risk-based decision-making process will allow to “process” travellers according to five risk-based groups, namely: Very high-risk passengers (those with a 
negative security record & negatively signalled by authorities); High risk passengers (those with a negative security record but not signalled by authorities); Medium risk passengers (those with no security 
record and not signalled by authorities); Low risk (those with positive security record); Very low risk passengers (those with a positive security record and positively signalled by authorities). 
7 sensor data plus annotations, these data will contribute to better interpret raw data provided by sensors and enable the evaluation of human factors 
8 The dashboard connects clustered BCPs and provide access to the system data base and LEA’s criminal data banks. 
9 TAS output includes both TTS score & some “instructions” to correctly interpret the TTS underlining the combined use of tech. and human resources. 
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the risk level of a traveller will determine, for every journey, the screening groups into which the 
traveller will fall for security clearance. 
The collection and analysis of information from multiple sources represents an important factor of 
innovation, as the risk assessment will be based on: information provided by the traveller on a 
voluntary basis (duly checked), agreement with “carriers” and destination managers, as well as 
sensors, PNR, criminal databases and other relevant resources (such as social media, that might 
provide additional info or weak signal on travellers’ movement and intentions). The usage of multiple 
sources of information is motivated by the following reasons: 
• “Official” data (such as PNR or traditional security databases) do not often allow to achieve a whole picture 
of travellers’ movement due to the lack of pieces of information; 
• “Weak signals” on travellers’ movement (provided by or extracted from additional data sources such as 
social media) can complement such a picture; 
• The information on travellers’ movements is not enough for assessing the risk level of passengers: we also 
need information on people behaviour and other attitudes to create an effective (and informed) risk profile 
to support decisions at the checkpoints. Additional sources such as social media and sensors can provide 
relevant information to inform advanced analytics with the aim of assessing such a risk profile and perform 
the so-called “digital screening”10. 
• Lastly but not less relevant main information about travellers are shared with security officers only when 
the traveller is already “on board” concentrating all the security measures in an overcrowded space and 
limited timeframe. 
We can consider the “additional” information11 according to the “fitness for purpose” approach, 
considering the practicability in collecting them and the “user acceptance”. The outlined solution is 
a system of systems, where multiple sources providing heterogeneous data will be organised, 
modelled and processed, based on a set of novel data analytics and analysis algorithms. Through 
adaptive cost-effective solutions for border crossing points and selective checks, the main aim is to 
quickly identify “bona-fide” travellers through the collection of relevant information about each 
single traveller from the time the travel ticket is bought or visa is issued, thus creating (as much as 
reasonably practicable) a personal trust profile for each traveller approaching EU crossing points.  
Big data and social media 
One of the “sensors” providing input “signals” to the TAS is “big data and social media”, an objective 
of the project is to selectively collect and analyse data coming from different sources including: Social 
                                               
10 The “digital screening” (which also includes the analysis of social media, but also the analysis of other sources in Internet) is an interesting trend that is being pursued 
also by US (actually they already started with automatic tools). See this article: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/01/29/we-already-screen-cell-phones-
at-the-border-will-social-media-be-any-different/#450fe3a25fa3. 
11 which could also include personal information 
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media information (time, location when available, networks, content/semantic); Traditional 
structured data from institutional databases (ERP, etc.); Travel process events (visa applications, 
tickets, etc.); ID checks; GeoTime Series, Sensors data, etc.. The traveller’s data would generally be 
collected from publicly available sources or will be provided voluntarily by the passenger to gain 
access to the “Fast-Track”; private information will not be collected without informed consent, in 
respect of privacy regulations12 and confidentiality. This integration represents a major challenge of 
social media analytics, as insights from the semantic processing and analysis of social media 
information are tightly bound to the ability of identifying the author of posts and tie his/her activity 
on social media with historical data from more traditional sources.  
The semantic engine part of the solution will be in charge of deep semantic text analysis. This analysis 
will start from the output of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) crawler (either Surface or Deep/Dark 
Web) or from other kind of sensors acquiring unstructured contents (also web form filled by traveller). 
If this content will be a multimedia one, a Speech to Text technology (STT) is needed in order to 
transcribe audio into electronically and accessible text. Understanding events/intentions in advance 
(Ex-Ante) and apply reasoning to the lessons learned (Ex-Post) are a crucial point from the 
investigation and deduction point of view. Prevention is the first step useful to understand if someone 
is writing/telling “bad” words regarding a politician of a country, a critical infrastructure, an 
organization. At the same time analysing the information coming from historical use cases, so after 
the event occurred, can give added value either to the live analysing or to the prevention one.  
As already mentioned this solution will implement also a crawling for both Surface and Deep/Dark 
web, to complement and integrate the other sources of information already described previously. The 
surface crawling component will be based on open technologies allowing end users to set the sources 
they need to acquire data from. The surface crawler engine will be able to gather content from open 
sources like RSS, Social Networks (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), Web and Search Engines (mainly 
Google, Bing and Yahoo). Surface crawler will be then extended to Deep Web by integrating 
additional and dedicated crawlers for these types of sources and combining the overall solution with 
anonymizers to access Dark Web. Plain text will be then extracted from the original content acquired 
by the sources under crawling and delivered to the semantic engine, for elaboration (content 
categorization, entity/relation/emotions extraction, stylo-metric analysis, etc.). The Deep Web 
crawler will be based on the adoption and integration of multiple dedicated crawlers, both proprietary 
and open, in order to have a synergy of their best functionalities and capabilities. In order to extend 
this capability also to Dark Web, making it even more relevant for illegal activities monitoring, an 
integration of dedicated proxy solution will be required: TOR and I2P will be mainly considered for 
this purpose. The fundamental concept is to achieve speed and mobility during the stop and search 
                                               
12 i.e. EU - General Data Protection Regulation 
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routine of travellers in every physical location they are. The solution can be used as well for accessing 
the data of the travellers prior to the date of the planned travel adding value to the Trust Assessment 
and delineating a picture of the traveller prior to his arrival to the departure gate. 
Traveller's Trust Level 
As already stated more times, the idea is that the traveller risk evaluation starts as soon as she/he 
applies for a visa, a passport or books a trip by whatever means of transport. The travellers’ journey 
is broken down into the following phases:  
• Booking phase, when the tickets are bought;  
• Preparation, the time between the booking phase and the actual initiation of the trip;  
• Pre-screening phase, all the trip segments before the border crossing;  
• Screening points, the border crossing itself;  
• After screening, the moments after the border crossing before the end of the trip.  
In each of these phases, the system may collect information on the traveller, with the aim of 
determining the Traveller's Trust Level (TTL). The information to be used to determine the TTL are 
the following: 
• Personal information: including data collected by LEAs (National Polices, Interpol, Europol, Frontex, 
FBI, etc.), or soft data like social network data on published contents and network of contacts,  
• Travel specific information, like number of the flight/train/bus, hotel booking (if any), transports 
booking at destination (car, motorbike, public transport…), period of stay, reason of the visit, and so 
on. For the travellers moving by car: the type, colour and identification marks of the vehicle (number 
plate) used to cross the border, the number of travelling passengers, the expected time range of the 
border crossing; 
• Behavioural data: including historical data from frequent traveller’s fidelity cards and credit cards, 
data collected by the platform during previous travels, or real-time acquisition of behavioural data via 
different “sensors”.  
• Passenger shadowing (train stations, bus stations, terminals, automatic identification of car plates, 
etc.); 
• Advanced big data analytics (Internet, social media, fake news, WIFI connections, etc.); 
• ID verification / Biometrics etc. etc.; 
• Remote sensing, sensors, etc. etc. (IoT, satellites, drones, etc.); In depth personal checks. 
Furthermore, the casting of the information net and the reliability of information need to be accurate; 
moreover, building of trust between parties and the sharing of data are as important as technology 
advancement. We outline again the initial concept - while security cannot be compromised, the 
traveller’s experience should be positive.  
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Results 
This solution aims to apply technologies in an efficient but effective manner by integrating new 
technologies with a risk-based outcome focussed approach to increase the reliability of the border 
crossing process and at the same time the experience of the traveller. This solution has been conceived 
as a system level goal-oriented project, which means that the impact relies on the capacity of the 
system to integrate in a sound architecture for individual technologies that will provide a larger benefit 
as a whole than in individual deployment. 
The primary objective of the project is to make an economically sustainable technological 
improvement in security at crossing points based on a risk analysis that combines information from 
multiple sources to enhance situational awareness for border control practitioners. The technology 
component is deployed based upon a researched operational concept for risk analysis. Flow 
management innovation (fair and fast) through innovative multiple information processing and use 
of advanced sensors / input channels to identify the TTS. Integrate current physical-inspection-based 
security checks with contactless or non-obvious detection  mechanisms (like border physical checks) 
–  progressive migration from actual solutions to the new approach, from the current “check-
everything-at-the-border” to the more efficient “check-everything-till-the-border” (i.e., from a 
“checkpoint” to a “check-process”), from the current “memory-less” approach to a more advanced 
risk-based  approach  (i.e. based on both historical and current quantity and quality of information 
provided). 
Potential Benefits 
The underlying concept is that not all borders crossing points are equal and particular situations and 
events could change substantially operational conditions, so potentially each BCP could be tailored 
to suit the needs of an environment at a given time saving unnecessary resources. Thanks to the full 
implementation of the solution the BCP will improve its throughput without the need to add more 
personnel. Use of on the shelf technologies as needed by the specific crossing point and situation. 
Economic benefits will derive by reinforcing the effectiveness of crossing borders through approved 
techniques and procedures this should be seen as an encouragement and reassurance to travel, thus 
increasing the GDP collectively across and through the countries. Additional benefits are: Ensure 
privacy and human rights are respected within new approaches to risk-based border crossing; 
Decrease border crossing times for the majority of travellers; Significantly reduce the cost of border 
security checks as a result of risk-based scalable border crossing point (BCP) configuration, and on-
the-shelf, low-cost technologies. In addition, the availability of TAS “sensors” open standards may 
offer a business opportunity to hard and soft companies.  
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Future developments 
<<For the traveller it would be ideal to cross borders without being slowed down. It is indeed likely 
that, in the next ten years or so, technologies make it possible to implement "no gate crossing point 
solutions"…>>  [European Commission Study] 
Recent years have witnessed technological and social changes appearing at an unexpected pace and 
spanning a wide set of aspects, such as technologies for personal identification, detection systems, 
social habits, new threats and new privacy and personal (ethical and social) issues. As a consequence, 
the challenge is to foresee technological solutions and social behaviours ten years from now, and the 
adoption of different technologies and behavioural models from those in play now. In the transport 
domain, a trade-off will emerge between the need to guarantee security of travellers, even against 
unexpected threats, and speed of security controls. Accordingly, it would be ideal for the traveller to 
be able to cross borders without being slowed down by queuing at crossing points gates as it was 
experimented in Dubai. The risk-based solution described above represents a sounding a building 
block to achieve the result. In a decade13 from now, technologies will make it possible to implement 
"no gate crossing point solutions14" that based on risk assessment methods, allow for seamless 
crossing of borders and security checks for the vast majority of travellers who meet the conditions of 
entry, and make sure that those who do not fulfil such conditions are refused entry. 
Main aspects to be considered: to understand how these technologies will be accepted (or rejected) 
by the public and key stakeholders15 requires greater insight into: (1) the likely constellations of 
technologies; (2) their potential ethical, legal and societal impacts, and (3) real-world, contextualised 
acceptability experiments assessing the passenger’s “feeling of safety”. 
Conclusions 
This paper proposes a new approach to border security checks based on risk analysis and trust 
assessments shared at the international level, it applies a “harmonisation by design” principle to 
ensure the progressive harmonisation and homogeneity of the procedures. The key technologies 
foreseen have been already tested on different borders both in Europe and South America / Africa. 
The system platform acts on six lines: Innovative double tier risk-based approach to security checks; 
High-penetration safe technologies for remote and flexible on-the-go screening of persons and 
                                               
13 PROTECT H2020 project: http://projectprotect.eu/ FRONTEX organizes workshops on Biometrics on the move for gateless BCPs. 
14 Refer also to the IATA and ACI Smart Security Initiative http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Pages/smart-security.aspx 
15 Air companies, Shipping companies, Railroad companies, Bus companies, Airports, Harbours, Highways companies, Destination managers,, Tourism operators, IATA, EDA, Frontex, Interpol, Europol, 
etc.  
  
 
Improving BCP Security.docx – Rev 02/09/2018 15.23 11 / 13 
vehicles; Mobile solutions based on mass market devices; Travellers’ pre-registration; real-time 
information sharing, traveller’s trust profile. “Bona Fide” travellers will benefit from simplified 
security controls based on prior processing of travel and relevant Internet data. The solution proposes 
a risk-based, outcome-focused approach to security controls rather than the current “one size fits all” 
scheme - pre-evaluating a personal risk profile on the basis of the traveller’s “history”, integrating 
available international police data, API16 and PNR data, and public data available on line, within the 
legal capacity of border authorities. The paper focus on one of the innovative solutions the Trust 
Assessment System – TAS, a kind of “black box” receiving as input a specific set of data coming 
from “sensors” analysing traveller’s information and behaviour and evaluating a traveller trust score 
(TTS) that together with additional “instructions” will determine the classification of the specific 
traveller and consequently the required security check procedure. 
  
                                               
16 Advance Passenger Information 
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